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Abstract 
We examine the academe-industry wage gap. Once self-selection and different personal 
characteristics of academic and industrial scientists have been taken into account the wage 
gap narrows from 28% to 13%. The counterfactual wage faced by an academic scientist 
increases with time spent on development and decreases with time spent on research. This 
finding challenges the idea of a solely negative relationship between science and wages. 
We further find that preferences for science augment the relationship between research 
orientation and wages. Overall, the results have implications for policy makers that aim to 
increase development oriented research activities at universities, individual scientists 
thinking about whether to pursue a career in industry or academe, and managers trying to 
hire academic scientists. 
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1. Introduction 
It is a stylized fact that scientists earn more in industry than in academe. The National 
Science Foundation (NSF) Science and Engineering indicators show that the median wage of a 
doctorate recipient up to five years after graduation is $85,000 in industry, compared to $65,000 
in academe (National Science Board, 2012). This difference is one of the main reasons that lead 
academic scientists to seek a position in industry (Walker, Vignoles, and Collins, 2010). 
Although monetary rewards represent only one component of the scientific reward system, they 
are highly valued by individual researchers. In a recent survey of more than 5,000 life scientists 
and physical scientists 37 percent of the academic scientists and 47 percent of the industrial 
scientists rated salary as a “very important” job factor (see Sauermann and Stephan, 2013, p. 
897). 
Despite the fact that the academe-industry wage differential plays a major role in scientists’ 
career decisions and, consequently, the production of knowledge in an economy, we know 
relatively little about the processes underlying the wage gap, or how the gap differs across 
individual scientists. Up to now, the debate centers on earning profiles within each sector, and 
the scientific orientation of industrial research.
1
  
A sparse literature tries to estimate the academe-industry wage difference. Agarwal and 
Ohyama (2013), for instance, compare wages of basic and applied scientists in industry and 
academe. While basic scientists earn less in academe than applied scientists, higher 
                                                 
1
 See for instance Sauermann & Roach (2014) or Stern (2004) for industrial wage dynamics. Many studies consider 
academic wage dynamics, including factors such as gender (McNabb and Wass, 1997; Barbezat, 1987; Bayer and 
Astin, 1968), seniority (Moore, Newman, and Turnball, 1998), and international wage differences (Altbach, 
Reisberg, Yudkevich, Androushcak, and Pacheco, 2012; Stevens, 2004; Ong and Mitchell, 2000). An earlier stream 
of research estimates academics’ earnings functions, finding that scientists’ earnings are concave, peaking late in 
their career (Stephan, 1996; Creedy, 1988; Diamond, 1986a; Laitner and Stafford, 1985; Lillard and Weiss, 1979; 
Weiss and Lillard, 1978). 
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complementarities between applied and basic science lead to smaller wage differences within 
industry. It remains an open question, though, how much of the academe-industry wage gap is 
driven by self-selection in the scientific labor market, and how much is driven by researchers’ 
focus on basic versus applied research. Some other studies examine the wage gap by comparing 
wages of academics with those of other workers (Walker et al., 2010; Stevens, 2004). While 
these studies provide useful information, they are limited in the assessment of academe-industry 
wage gaps because they compare wages of academics with those of non-academics (or, as in 
Walker et al., 2010, a selected subsample thereof). 
We estimate the academe-industry wage gap controlling for self-selection into industry or 
academe and for differences in research focus. A rich dataset of Belgian Ph.D. holders allows us 
to match academic and industrial scientists, such that we can compare scientists with similar 
preferences, research activities, and other personal characteristics. Since we observe how much 
time scientists spend on research versus development, we can account in a highly detailed 
manner for differences in research activities. Other studies (e.g. Agarwal and Ohyama, 2013) 
have instead relied on a categorical classification of basic and applied research.  
Once we correct for self-selection and differences in research activities, the average wage 
gap drops from 28% to 13%. Further, the size of the wage gap is partly determined by research 
activities: an academic who spends much time on research faces a significantly lower wage gap, 
while the wage gap is much higher for academics who spend much time on development.  
This analysis complements Stern’s (2004) and Sauermann and Roach’s (2014) 
examinations of the science-wage relationship by showing that development activities relate 
positively to the wage gap. We are able to show this through detailed measures of the time 
scientists spend on research and development, whereas Stern (2004) uses relatively broad 
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categories, i.e. the chance to continue previous research and the permission to publish, in order to 
quantify a job’s scientific environment. Sauermann and Roach (2014) estimate scientist’s 
reservation wages for jobs with the opportunity to publish. We finally show that preferences 
have a moderating role: scientists with a high taste for science trade off monetary rewards 
against research orientation at a higher level than those scientists with a rather low taste for 
science. 
These findings have important implications for scientists deciding to seek employment in 
industry or academe, managers trying to hire academic scientists, and policy makers aiming to 
increase applied research and commercialization at universities. A typical academic scientist, 
with a strong taste for science and a research-focused agenda, will earn significantly less in 
industry than a naïve average wage comparison would suggest. Moreover, the wage gap is by far 
the largest for academic researchers working on product developments. As academics are more 
and more urged to engage in development orientated research projects, careers in industry 
become more attractive, which in turn increases the risk of an academic brain drain. Scientists 
with a high taste for science, however, might still be better off in academe. Lastly, the significant 
remaining wage gap after matching indicates that factors other than preferences and research 
activities, e.g. differences in research valorization, are responsible for a large part of the 
academe-industry wage differential. 
2. Conceptual framework 
Conceptually, the wages of scientists are determined by their willingness to trade money 
for research-oriented jobs (preference effects), and whether there is sharing of the returns to new 
inventions between employers and scientists (productivity effects). The industry-academe wage 
gap is then the result of institutional differences in these factors between industry and academe. 
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To frame this discussion, we start with a brief description of differences in the scientific reward 
systems in academe and industry. 
2.1. The scientific reward system in academe and industry  
As mentioned above, wage differences between academe and industry are arguably driven 
by differences in the organization of research in both sectors (e.g. Sauermann and Stephan, 2013; 
Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein, 2008). Academics tend to face flatter wage profiles than 
scientists in industry. This is especially the case in European countries where academics are 
hired as civil cervants. Wages in academe are further largely independent of scientific 
productivity, because academic research is difficult to monitor, and because performance 
contingent pay risks encouraging scientists to focus on safe projects with guaranteed results 
(Konrad and Pfeffer, 1990).
2
 Instead of money, the academic reward system depends in large 
part on nonmonetary rewards to incentivize their researchers to engage in the most fruitful 
research projects. Nonmonetary rewards of science include the intellectual challenge involved 
with new projects, pleasure from “puzzle solving”, and peer recognition by other scholars 
(Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein, 2008; Stephan, 1996; Dasgupta and David, 1994; Merton, 
1973).  
Firms, in contrast, are supposed to engage in science to maximize profits, focusing on 
applied research topics with the highest expected returns for new product developments (Arora 
and Gambardella, 1994; Rosenberg, 1990; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, 1989). Industrial 
researchers thus tend to work on more narrowly defined research projects with emphasis on the 
commercial potential of their outputs.  
                                                 
2
 Some academics do manage to increase their income with consulting, speaking fees, or prizes. 
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Stern (2004) shows that these differences in the scientific reward systems have important 
implications for the relationship between science and wages in industry. On the one hand, firms 
could pay out a compensating differential, because researchers in industry have less freedom in 
research than they would have in academe (which Stern calls the preference hypothesis). This 
leads to a negative relation between research orientation and wages in industry (similar results 
have been found by Sauermann and Roach, 2014; Agarwal and Ohyama, 2013; Sauermann and 
Stephan, 2013; Fini and Lacetera, 2010; Lacetera, 2009; and Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein, 
2008).  
On the other hand, firms might participate in science to increase their absorptive capacity, 
capture spillovers and raise their R&D productivity. This might lead to a positive relation 
between research and wages if firms share at least a part of those productivity gains with their 
scientists. Stern labels this the productivity hypothesis (see also Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
Rosenberg, 1990). The academe-industry wage gap varies depending on which effect dominates 
equilibrium wages of scientists in industry.  
2.2. Scientists’ wages 
Our conceptualization and argumentation regarding the relationships between twages, 
scientific orientation, and tastes of researchers follows the logic of Stern’s (2004) economic 
model of science and wages.
3
 We briefly illustrate our thoughts against this background and 
incorporate them in an extended model below. The original model starts with defining the utility 
function of an individual scientist as the combination of his wage and the pleasure derived from 
working at a science-orientated workplace:  
                                                 
3
 For brevity, we only show those parts of Stern’s model that help to clarify our thoughts and argumentation. For 
details and all the implicit assumptions made to keep the model simple we refer to Stern (2004) and the cited 
literature there. 
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𝑈𝑖 = 𝜆0 + 𝛼𝑠𝛾𝑖𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑗 + 𝑤𝑖, 
where 𝛼𝑠 represents the scientist’s preference for science, 𝛾𝑖 is the scientist’s ability, 𝑆𝐶𝐼 
indicates whether a job has a scientific orientation or not, and 𝑤𝑖 is the scientist’s wage.  
Stern then defines the profit generated by scientist i and earned by firm j as: 
𝜋𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛾𝑖(𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑗) − 𝑤𝑖,𝑗 − 𝛿𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑗. 
Firms receive returns 𝛽𝑠 if they adopt a scientific orientation, but they have to pay a fee, 𝛿, 
for e.g. specialized equipment and materials needed to carry out research projects. They also 
have to pay the wage of the scientist, regardless of their engagement in science. As scientists are 
assumed to receive a share 𝜙𝜖(0,1) of the returns to their research, the equilibrium wage 
industrial scientists earn is then derived as: 
𝜔𝑖,𝑗
∗ = 𝛾𝑖𝛽0 + 𝛾𝑖(𝜙𝛽𝑠 − 𝛼𝑠)𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑗 . 
 The wage equation describes the relationship between the productivity of research, the 
preference for science and the scientific orientation of the workplace. The preference effect 
dominates the productivity effect as long as 𝛼𝑠 is larger than the quasi-rent stemming from 
research that a scientist can extract (𝜙𝛽𝑠).  
Without changing the basic setup of the model, we assume that a job can have a certain 
degree of scientific orientation, which is determined by the time a scientist can spend on research 
as well as on development. We assume that the time spent on research serves a scientist’s 
preference for science relatively more than the time spent on product development. Incorporating 
this notion in the utility function of the scientist gives us: 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝜆0 + 𝛼𝑠𝛾𝑖𝑅𝑗 +
𝛼𝑠
𝜃
𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑗 + 𝑤𝑖, 
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where 𝑅𝑗 represents the time a scientist spends on research, and 𝐷𝑗  the time he spends on 
development. The parameter 𝜃 > 1 embodies the idea that a scientist’s preference for research is 
less served by focusing on product or process developments as compared to general research. 
The profit function of a firm is correspondingly determined by the returns to research and 
development activities. We argue that the returns to research as well as development are 
increasing with decreasing marginal returns, but development activities are expected to yield 
generally higher returns than research activities. One reason might be the higher risks to achieve 
commercially viable outputs by engaging in basic research as opposed to development oriented 
research. This gives us the following profit equation: 
𝜋𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛾𝑖(𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑟
𝑧𝑅𝑗 + 𝛽𝑑
𝑦𝐷𝑗) − 𝑤𝑖,𝑗 − 𝛿(𝑅𝑗 + 𝐷𝑗), 
where 𝛽𝑟
𝑧 represents the returns to research activities and 𝛽𝑑
𝑦
 represents the returns to 
development activities, with 𝑧𝜖(0,1), 𝑦𝜖(0,1) and 𝑧 < 𝑦.4 The equilibrium wage is then given 
by: 
𝜔𝑖,𝑗
∗ = 𝛾𝑖𝛽0 + 𝛾𝑖[(𝜙𝛽𝑟
𝑧 − 𝛼𝑠)𝑅𝑗 + (𝜙𝛽𝑑
𝑦 −
𝛼𝑠
𝜃
) 𝐷𝑗]. 
This wage equation describes the relationship between the time scientists spend on 
research and development, their preference for science and the productivity of their activities. 
The wages of scientists decrease in the time spent on research as long as the preference for 
science, 𝛼𝑠, is larger than the quasi-rent from research activities a scientist can extract (𝜙𝛽𝑟
𝑧). 
Regarding the time spent on development, the compensating differential, 
𝛼𝑠
𝜃
, is relatively 
low, while the productivity effect, 𝜙𝛽𝑑
𝑦
, is relatively large. Hence, it is more likely that the 
                                                 
4
 As such, the profit function cannot explain why some firms choose to engage only in research. For simplicity 
reasons we refrained from incorporating this in the model, but it could, for instance, be realized by accounting for 
different functional forms of the costs of research and development activities. As noted above, the assumption of 
higher productivity of development is not essential for the model, but does help us to derive implications. In practice 
both activities are complementary and face diminishing returns, and which activity has the highest marginal 
productivity depends on the relative levels of investment in both. 
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productivity effect dominates the preference effect regarding development oriented research. In 
this case, scientists’ wages are expected to increase with the time spent on development. 
We can also see that a high taste for science (large 𝛼𝑠) will increase the negative wage 
effect of the time spent on research as long as the returns to research are rather low. In contrast, 
as long as the productivity effect of development oriented research activities dominates the 
preference effect, taste for science will, if at all, only slightly negatively moderate the positive 
productivity effect of development oriented research (cf. section 2.4 below). 
2.3. The wage gap  
Drawing on our extended model of Stern (2004), we can derive implications for the 
academe-industry wage gap. We build on the basic assumption that in academe spending more 
time on research does not directly affect scientists’ wages,5 while in industry our 
conceptualization and the extant evidence indicates a negative relationship. This leads us to 
formulate: 
Hypothesis 1: The wage gap faced by an academic scientist decreases with the 
proportion of time spent on research. 
It is not straightforward to derive a similar hypothesis regarding how academic scientists 
would profit from conducting development oriented research relative to their counterparts in 
industry. On the one hand, academic scientists might profit more, since they can typically 
appropriate a part of the returns to their inventions. On the other hand, they might profit less, 
since universities have less assets, knowledge, and incentives to successfully commercialize 
innovations. This leads us to formulate the following two hypotheses regarding the effect of 
development oriented research activities on the wage gap:  
                                                 
5
 However, academic scientists who successfully focus on research could have higher chances for promotion, and 
hence increase earnings in the long run. 
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Hypothesis 2a:  The wage gap faced by an academic scientist increases with the 
proportion of time spent on development. 
Hypothesis 2b:  The wage gap faced by an academic scientist decreases with the 
proportion of time spent on development. 
While these hypotheses have direct implications for the average academe-industry wage 
differential, the actual size of the gap depends on the marginal impacts of spending time on 
research or development, and the difference between the average time academic and industrial 
scientists actually spend on research or development. Therefore, we refrain from formulating 
hypotheses about whether the wage gap will become wider or narrower once these differences of 
academic and industrial scientists have been accounted for. A detailed evaluation follows in 
section 5. 
Two extant empirical investigations are closely related to the present paper’s examination. 
Stern’s (2004) empirical analysis of young biologists’ job offers revealed a negative relation 
between the scientific orientation of a particular job and the offered wage. He concluded that the 
preference effect dominates potential productivity effects in industry. In line with this finding, 
Sauermann and Roach (2014) have recently shown that scientists with a high taste for science 
demand higher salaries if they have to give up the right to publish research findings. Both results 
back hypothesis 1.
6
 We are able to go beyond Stern (2004) and Sauermann and Roach (2014) by 
observing the time scientists actually spend on ‘research’ and ‘development’ in their jobs. This 
allows us to overcome the focus on specific aspects of ‘science’ formerly employed in the 
literature. Specifically, we will distinguish between the proportion of time a scientist spends on 
                                                 
6
 It is worthwhile to mention that these findings do not indicate that there are no productivity effects at all, but rather 
that the preference effect on average dominates potential productivity effects with regard to basic research. 
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research activities, which are not directly related to product or process development, and the 
proportion of time a scientist spends on the development of new products and processes. 
2.4. Scientists’ preferences 
The academe-industry wage differential can also be explained by the preferences of 
scientists. Specifically, how much compensation an industrial scientist demands for working in a 
more or less scientifically orientated job depends critically on his ‘taste for science’ (Sauermann 
and Roach, 2014). Researchers who have a high taste for science are considered to have a high 
intrinsic motivation to perform research, a desire for intellectual challenge, and strong 
preferences for classic aspects of the academic system, e.g. freedom in choosing research topics, 
focus on basic research questions, and rewards through peer recognition (Sauermann and Roach, 
2014; Roach and Sauermann, 2010; Stern, 2004; Stephan and Levin, 1992; Merton, 1973).
7
 As 
taste for science rises, scientists derive higher utility from doing research, leading them to accept 
lower compensation for a stronger research orientation of their jobs. We formulate:  
Hypothesis 3: Provided that the wage gap an academic scientist faces becomes smaller 
with more time spent on research (Hypothesis 1), this effect is larger for 
scientists with a high taste for science. 
Moreover, a well-established literature has shown that scientists’ choices for a career in 
academe or industry are affected by their taste for science (Sauermann and Roach, 2012; Roach 
and Sauermann, 2010; Stern 2004). This leads to strong self-selection in the scientific labor 
market which has to be taken into account in wage comparisons. Selection effects in the labor 
                                                 
7
 Scientists’ taste for business, on the other hand, represents motivation through extrinsic factors, such as wages, 
extralegal benefits, and job security. Noteworthy, both preferences are not mutually exclusive, meaning that 
scientists can have a high taste for science as well as a high taste for business (Sauermann & Roach, 2012; Agarwal 
& Ohyama, 2012; Roach & Sauermann, 2010). We include the researchers’ taste for business into our empirical 
analysis to account for potential confounding effects. 
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market are comprehensively revealed in Roach and Sauermann (2010), who found that young 
Ph.D. students with a high taste for science are more likely to prefer a career in academe, while 
those with a greater concern for salary, access to resources, and applied research prefer a career 
in industry (see also Agarwal and Ohyama, 2013).  
3. Methodological remarks 
One of the fundamental problems in the empirical assessment of the academe-industry 
wage gap is thus self-selection in the scientific labor market, which may distort a consistent 
estimation of the factual wage differential and its determinants. Since scientists are not randomly 
assigned to industry or academe but rather choose to do so based on their personal characteristics 
and preference for science, standard OLS regressions are likely to yield inconsistent estimates.  
As non-random assignment is a very common problem in empirical policy evaluations, a 
number of methods have been developed to address this issue (Heckman, 1976; see Blundell and 
Costa Dias (2009) for an overview of methods used in labor market policy evaluations, or 
Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)). In this application, we control for selection through a matching 
estimator.
8
 Matching techniques have been used by several labor economists interested in wage 
gap estimations and labor policy evaluations (see, among others, Nopo, 2008; Frolich, 2007; 
Gerfin and Lechner, 2002; Angrist, 1998; Card and Sullivan, 1988). Matching has several 
advantages over parametric estimators (cf. Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). It aims to create the 
                                                 
8
 Several other methods are available to deal with selection, including difference-in-difference designs, regression 
discontinuity designs, instrumental variable estimation, and control functions. The difference-in-difference method 
requires panel data on scientists that switch from academe to industry (or the other way around) due to an exogenous 
shock. As the data we employ is a cross-section and no exogenous shock is observed we cannot apply this estimator. 
A regression discontinuity design is also not applicable because there is no (arbitrary) rule that would determine the 
treatment (being an academic scientist). IV estimators as well as selection models rely on the idea to instrument 
selection into industry or academe through an instrumental variable, which affects the treatment but not the 
outcome, i.e. the wage gap. It is notoriously difficult to find a valid instrument in this particular case and we could 
not find a suitable instrument for this application either.  
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conditions of an experiment with random assignment by constructing a control sample with 
equal characteristics as the treatment sample. While it does not impose a functional form on the 
selection, it relies on the assumption that there are no unobserved variables that drive selection 
into academic or industrial positions. In order to minimize concerns in this regard we show 
below that our control sample consists only of industrial scientists that are indistinguishable from 
academic scientists along all known drivers of self-selection and several other personal 
characteristics.  
The goal of our analysis is to calculate how much money an academic scientist would have 
earned in an industrial position where she spends the same proportion of her time on research 
and development oriented activities. Technically, we want to calculate the average treatment 
effect on the treated: 
𝐸(𝛼𝑇𝑇) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑇|𝑆 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝐶|𝑆 = 1), 
where 𝑆 denotes whether the individual has been treated (1: in academia), 𝑌𝑇 denotes the 
wage of the treated group (academic scientists), and 𝑌𝐶 represents the wages of the control group 
(industrial researchers). Since we cannot directly observe the wages of academic researchers had 
they chosen to work in industry, we have to estimate them. This is made possible by Rubin’s 
Conditional Independence Assumption, which states that for a scientist with a set of exogenous 
characteristics 𝑋 participation and potential outcomes are independent from one another (Rubin, 
1977): 
𝐸(𝑌𝐶|𝑆 = 1, 𝑋) = 𝐸(𝑌𝐶|𝑆 = 0, 𝑋) 
As long as we are able to find for all academic scientists a counterpart in industry (0 <
𝑃(𝑆 = 1|𝑋) < 1), which is known as the common support restriction, we can use the wages of 
industrial scientists to estimate the wages of the academic scientists had they not been treated: 
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𝐸(𝛼𝑇𝑇) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑇|𝑆 = 1, 𝑋 = 𝑥) − 𝐸(𝑌𝐶|𝑆 = 0, 𝑋 = 𝑥). 
In order to condition the samples on observable characteristics, we employ nearest 
neighbor matching (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1998) where we choose the most similar 
control observation for each treatment observation. This is however difficult to achieve when 
many dimensions at the same time are considered. It is therefore more convenient to use 
propensity score matching, where the matching occurs on a propensity score 𝑃(𝑋) estimated 
using a Probit model. This has no clear advantages or disadvantages over multidimensional 
matching (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1998; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), but makes it 
much easier to find adequate controls. According to the classic literature on propensity score 
matching, the average treatment effect on the treated can be calculated as the mean difference of 
the matched samples: 
?̂?𝑇𝑇 =
1
𝑛𝑇
(∑ 𝑌𝑖
𝑇
𝑖 − ∑ 𝑌𝑖
?̂?
𝑖 ), 
with 𝑌𝑖
?̂?  being the counterfactual wage for scientist 𝑖 and 𝑛𝑇 being the sample size of the 
academic scientists. Below, we will compare the descriptive academe-industry wage gap, 
calculated as the difference in means, with (1) standard OLS estimates of the wage gap, (2) the 
difference in means after balancing the samples of academic and industrial scientists using 
propensity score matching, and (3) OLS estimates of the wage gap based on the balanced sample 
of academic and industrial scientists. If selection effects in the scientific labor market are present, 
we would expect that the descriptive wage gap is the largest, while OLS estimates based on the 
balanced sample after matching show the lowest wage gap.  
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4. Data 
We employ data from the Belgian edition of the Careers of Doctorate Holders (CDH) 
survey (Federaal Wetenschapsbeleid, 2006). The survey took place in 2006 (reference year: 
2005), and was created by the OECD in cooperation with Eurostat and the UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics. The primary goal was to gain detailed knowledge about career paths of doctorate 
holders.
9
 The CDH survey contains detailed questions, including selected ones about the 
scientists’ research activities, which allow for a much more accurate approximation of activities 
than other large scale data sources (e.g. the frequently used National Science Foundation’s 
Survey of Doctorate Recipients). Combined with information on scientists’ and researchers’ 
earnings, it offers a unique chance to investigate the academe-industry wage differential and how 
the nature of research activities affects it.  
The response rate of the survey is estimated at 17.7 percent (7,160 responses). Of these, we 
select natural scientists and engineers currently employed in industry or academe and being in 
the first 30 years of their careers. After removing observations with inconclusive answers (see 
appendix 1 for a detailed overview of the sample construction), and retaining only those who 
answered all relevant questions, we arrive at a final sample covering 486 academic scientists and 
759 industrial scientists. Below, we describe all variables used in the analysis (see Table 1 for 
variable definitions). Table 3 lists corresponding summary statistics. Table A3 in the appendix 
presents pair-wise correlations. 
  
                                                 
9
 Detailed information on the project can be found in Unesco (2012), Eurostat (2012), or OECD (2013). Summary 
statistics based on the full survey have been published in Auriol (2007, 2010). Statistics on the Belgian data 
collection can be found in Moortgat & Van Mellaert (2011). For the methodological background and core 
questionnaire see Auriol et al. (2012). 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
Variable Description 
WAGE 
Reported earnings before taxes in 2005, taking all occupations into 
account. 
Motives   
TASTE_SCIENCE 
Respondents were asked to indicate why they chose a research 
career (7 possible reasons in binary form). We applied exploratory 
factor analysis (results reported in Appendix 2), extracting two 
factors. 
TASTE_SCIENCE correlates positively with intellectual challenge, 
independence, contribution to society, and work circumstances, 
representing intrinsic motivation and higher preference for 
‘classic’ science. TASTE_BUSINESS correlates positively with salary, 
extralegal benefits, career prospects, and job security, representing 
extrinsic motivation. 
TASTE_BUSINESS 
  
Nature of research activities  
RES_SHARE 
Respondents were asked how much of their time they spend on 
average on research and development activities. RES_SHARE is the 
sum of the share of time assigned to “executing or guiding 
research” and “interpreting others’ research”. DEV_SHARE is the 
sum of the share of time assigned to “improving existing products 
or processes” and “developing new products or processes”. Both 
range from 0 to 100 percent of time. 
DEV_SHARE 
  
General controls  
CAREER_YEARS Time since graduation in years. 
AGE The age of the respondent in years. 
TIME_CURRENTJOB 
The time the respondent has been employed in the current job, in 
years. 
RELATIONSHIP 
1 if the respondent indicates to be cohabitating or married, 0 
otherwise. 
CHILDREN 
1 if the respondent indicates to have children younger than 18, 0 
otherwise. 
GENDER 1 if the respondent is female, 0 otherwise. 
NATURAL SCIENCES 
1 if the respondent indicates to be active in the natural sciences 
(“mathematics, computer science, informatics”; physics; 
chemistry; geology; biology; other natural sciences), 0 if the 
respondents indicates to be active in engineering or technological 
sciences (civil, mechanical, chemical, electrical, electronic 
engineering; material sciences; medical engineering techniques; 
environmental science; biotechnology; nanotechnology; other 
engineering or technological disciplines). 
HOURS_WORKED Self-reported average number of hours worked per week. 
  
Controls for ability  
TIMETOPHD_PROP 
The time the respondent spent to complete his or her doctorate. 
Calculated as the deviation from the mean time to completion 
within detailed scientific field and ten-year graduation cohort. A 
score equal to one indicates that the doctorate was completed at the 
average time within field and cohort. A score lower than one 
indicates that the doctorate was completed more quickly.  
SCHOLARSHIP 
1 if the respondent received a government or private grant to fund 
his or her doctorate, 0 otherwise. 
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Dependent variable: wage 
The outcome of interest is the sum of the scientist’s or researcher’s self-reported annual 
earnings before taxes.
10,11
 Academics reported earning 52,203 EUR on average, while industrial 
researchers reported 67,019 EUR. This amounts to a wage gap of 28.3 percent. Median wages 
are 49,100 EUR for academics versus 60,000 EUR for industrial researchers. These numbers are 
very similar to the median wages reported by the Survey of Doctorate Recipients in the US, 
which were 65,000 USD for academics versus 85,000 USD for industrial researchers, or a 
corresponding wage gap of 30.8% (National Science Board, 2012). Figure 2 plots the wage 
distributions within academe and industry. The earnings of industrial scientists are shifted 
somewhat to the right compared to those of academic scientists. Industrial wages also show a 
significantly longer right tail than academic wages, reflecting flatter earnings profiles in 
academia.  
Academic wages in Belgium differ structurally from those in the United States: academics 
are usually hired as civil servants and the corresponding wage scales for public sector workers 
are set by a governmental decree in negotiation with strong labor unions. Wages in the Belgian 
academic sector are therefore only to a small degree influenced by competition in the scientific 
labor market. The main source of variance in academic wages stems from job tenure, position 
and side activities, e.g. speaking fees, which are included in the CDH’s definition of the yearly 
wage.   
                                                 
10
 The results change only slightly when we take hourly wage as the main variable of interest instead of the annual 
wage. The corresponding results are presented in Appendix 4. 
11
 In order to ensure a clear differentiation between academic and industrial scientists and control for systematic 
differences caused through multiple employments, we discarded scientists and researchers with multiple jobs.  
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Figure 1: Wage distribution by sector 
 
 
Explanatory variables 
Activities: time spent on research and development 
The CDH survey includes questions about how scientists spend their working time. These 
questions allow a more fine-grained measurement of scientists’ activities compared to most 
statistics used in the extant literature, which typically indicate the main focus of a scientists’ 
research activities, e.g. basic versus applied research, but do not provide a weighted measure of 
different activities (e.g. Agarwal and Ohyama, 2013; Sauermann and Stephan, 2013).  
In order to approximate the proportion of time a scientist spends on research activities 
(RES_SHARE) we sum the share of time spent on “performing or guiding research” and 
“interpreting the research of others”. The time a researcher spends on development oriented 
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or processes” and “developing new products or processes”.12 Descriptive statistics show that 
academic scientists spend on average 50 percent of their time on research activities, and 7 
percent of their time on development activities, while these numbers correspond to respectively 
29 percent and 40 percent for industrial researchers. The picture that these numbers draw is in 
line with the common notion that academic scientists tend to focus more on basic rather than 
applied research, while industrial scientists tend to spend much more time on product and 
process development. Hence, we expect the wage gap to narrow after balancing the data for these 
factors: industrial researchers who spend more time on research and less time on development 
than the average researcher should earn less in industry, as hypothesized in our conceptual 
framework. 
A crucial advantage of our data is the multidimensional continuous measurement of 
engagement in research and development. Many scientists spend nontrivial shares (≥1%) of their 
time on research as well as development: 30% of the academics, and 65% of researchers. Only 
16% of academics indicate to be full-time researchers, and only 6% of industrial researchers are 
engaged full-time in development.  
Motives 
We proxy scientists’ preferences through their motives as captured through the survey 
question “why did you choose a research career?” The answers were recorded in binary form. 
Table 2 shows the differences between industry and academe, which are in line with previous 
research on motivation-driven sector choice based on US scientists’ data (Roach and Sauermann, 
2010).  
                                                 
12
 Agarwal and Ohyama (2013) define scientists’ activities as primarily basic or primarily applied in nature, while 
Sauermann and Stephan (2013) make a distinction between scientists primarily engaged in basic research, those 
primarily engaged in applied research, and those primarily engaged in development. Our measure of research 
activities is most likely mainly driven by basic research activities but also picks up applied research components.  
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Table 2: Motives by sector 
 
Academia Industry 
p-value of two-
sided t-test on 
mean differences 
INTELLECTUAL CHALLENGE 0.84 0.62 p<0.0001 
SALARY 0.04 0.08 p=0.0106 
EXTRALEGAL BENEFITS 0.00 0.02 p=0.0035 
CAREER  0.16 0.18 p=0.3046 
JOB SECURITY 0.09 0.04 p=0.0039 
WORK CIRCUMSTANCES 0.29 0.18 p<0.0001 
INDEPENDENCE 0.65 0.33 p<0.0001 
CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIETY 0.17 0.06 p<0.0001 
Notes: Share of respondents in each sector who indicated being motivated by the respective 
factor. 
 
The literature on scientists’ motives finds that scientists have a certain taste for science as 
well as business (Roach and Sauermann, 2010; Sauermann and Roach, 2012; Agarwal and 
Ohyama, 2013). Taste for business represents motivation through extrinsic factors, such as 
wages, extralegal benefits, and job security (for a definition of taste for science see section 2 and 
the cited literature).  In order to enhance comparability with this literature, we extracted tastes for 
science and business from the answers through exploratory factor analysis (see Appendix 2 for 
detailed results).
13
 In line with the extant literature, academic scientists score higher on taste for 
science than industrial scientists (0.43 versus -0.28, two-sided t-test on mean differences: 
t(1243)=-13.07, p<0.001), and lower on taste for business (-0.12 versus 0.79, two-sided t-test on 
mean differences: t(1243)=3.52, p<0.001). Because of this, we expect the wage gap to narrow 
after balancing the sample through matching: scientists in industry who have a high taste for 
science and a low taste for business are more willing to trade off wage for publishing 
opportunities, and should hence earn less than average (Sauermann and Roach, 2014). 
                                                 
13
 Our results are robust to alternatively taking the sums of CHALLENGE, CONTRIBUTION, and INDEPENDENCE to 
represent taste for science. 
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It should be noted that scientists and researchers can have a high taste for science and 
business at the same time (cf. Sauermann and Roach, 2012), and that tastes might change 
through time or socialization in the workplace (Sauermann & Roach, 2012), while we measure 
them at the time the survey was carried out. As such, our results concerning tastes should be 
interpreted with care. 
As mentioned above, matching estimates need to account for all factors that affect 
selection into industry or academe. Therefore, we include as many factors as possible in the 
analysis. In addition to tastes and research activities, we include scientists’ ability, effort, career 
experience and demographic characteristics as covariates. It might be argued that some of these 
factors do not directly cause selection, or are subject to reverse causality. For example, scientists 
potentially choose the amount of effort they put into their work as a function of wage prospects, 
and time spent on research and development are consequences of selection instead of causes. As 
such, the matching should not be viewed with a causal interpretation in mind. Nevertheless, the 
identification of the wage gap should only improve by conditioning on these factors, so we 
include all of them as covariates. 
Ability 
Ability influences our estimations in two ways. First, more able scientists are likely to be 
more productive, and thus earn more. Second, ability has been shown to cause selection into 
applied or basic research: in academe, more able scientists are more likely to prefer basic 
research topics than applied research, since academe tends to offer more resources to conduct 
basic research. Higher complementarities between basic and applied research in industry cause 
these differences in access to resources to be smaller, leading to no such selection in industry 
(Agarwal and Ohyama, 2013). As ability is usually unobservable to the econometrician it is 
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important to find suitable proxies that pick up as much as possible of the unobserved variance. 
Common ability proxies such as education are not applicable since all respondents attained a 
Ph.D. Indicators such as publication or citation counts are also biased in the context of this study: 
institutional differences between industry and academe lead to academics being more prone to 
publish. Reliance on publications would thus lead to an upward ability bias in academics’ ability 
as compared to industrial researchers.  
Nevertheless, the CDH survey allows us to create two proxies that are not affected by 
selection into industry or academe. The first one is based on the main source of funding of the 
respondents’ Ph.D. studies. Government and private Ph.D. scholarships tend to select strongly on 
applicants’ previous academic performance.14 At the same time, Ph.D. students are strongly 
encouraged to apply for these scholarships. Therefore, having a scholarship (SCHOLARSHIP) 
should separate a higher-skilled group from a lower-skilled group. Agarwal and Ohyama (2013) 
employ grant data in a similar fashion as one among two other controls for ability.  
The time a Ph.D. holder spent to complete his dissertation serves as a second proxy for 
ability. In order to deal with heterogeneity across fields and time, we calculate time to 
completion as a proportional deviation from the mean time to completion within a field and a 
ten-year graduation cohort (TIMETOPHD_PROP).
15
 A value equal to one indicates that the scientist 
completed the Ph.D. in an average amount of time, while values less than one indicate faster and 
thus better performance. A similar measure is used by Agarwal and Ohyama (2013), where time 
to completion of Bachelor’s degree is taken. 
                                                 
14
 For instance, one of the main Flemish institutions distributing Ph.D. scholarships (FWO) lists “research ability 
and potential (including course results)” and “research skills and methodology” as the first two selection criteria for 
its Ph.D. fellowships (FWO, 2013). 
15
 We consider the researchers’ detailed research domain (listed in table 1) for this calculation. 
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Both proxies have the advantage of being based on the respondent’s Ph.D. education, and 
are thus independent of later career decisions. The main disadvantage is that there is some 
unobserved ability variance that we have to leave uncontrolled. We find some difference in 
ability proxies between the academic and industrial samples: industrial researchers do not on 
average complete their dissertation faster or slower than academic researchers, but are slightly 
more likely to obtain a Ph.D. scholarship (56% versus 50%). Hence, we expect that balancing on 
ability proxies will slightly narrow the wage gap. 
Effort 
Effort is an important determinant of wage. Therefore, we include the self-reported number 
of hours worked during an average week as a further matching variable (HOURS_WORKED).
16
 
Academic scientists report working 50 hours per week on average, while industrial researchers 
report 48. Since more working hours positively correlate with pay, the wage gap should slightly 
lower when this difference is accounted for. 
Career Experience 
Experience is another well-known driver of scientists’ wages: several studies indicate that 
academic scientists’ earnings profiles are concave from below, and peak late in their careers. 
(Stephan, 1996; Creedy, 1988; Diamond, 1986; Laitner and Stafford, 1985; Lillard and Weiss, 
1979; Weiss and Lillard, 1978). Age and cohort effects are also important for scientists’ 
productivity (Stephan, 1996; Stephan and Levin, 1992), further affecting wages. In the matching, 
we control for three time-related factors. The first, AGE, is the natural age of the scientist. The 
second, CAREER_YEARS, is the time since the scientist obtained his Ph.D. The last time-related 
measure is the time spent in the current job (TIME_CURRENTJOB). As scientists spend more time in 
                                                 
16
 Appendix 4 provides results based on the hourly wage instead of the annual wage as an alternative to control for 
differences in scientists’ efforts. 
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a position, they accumulate job-specific skills which probably increase wage. In academe 
specifically, wages are known to rise with job tenure and academic rank, which both increase 
over time.  
The academic and industrial samples are balanced in terms of career age (11.85 years in 
academe vs. 11.45 years in industry, p=0.381), but the scientists in the academic sample are 
slightly older than those in industry (41.70 years versus 40.88 years, p=0.080). They have also 
spent more time in their present position (8.84 years versus 7.41, p<0.001). Because industrial 
researchers are on average younger and have less experience, the wage gap should widen once 
the samples have been balanced in this dimension. 
Demographics 
Supplementary to the work related attributes, we take some demographic factors into 
account that may have an influence on wage setting as well as career decisions. These include 
gender (GENDER, takes value one if the scientist is a woman), relationship status (RELATIONSHIP, 
takes value one if the scientist is married or cohabiting), and whether the scientist has children 
(CHILDREN, takes value one if the scientist has children younger than 18). Scientists in academe 
are more likely to be female (22% versus 16%, p=0.011), are not more likely to be in a 
relationship (83% vs. 85%, p=0.436), but are less likely to have children (54% versus 64%, 
p<0.001). If the gender wage gap is larger in industry than in academe, we would expect the 
industry-academe wage gap to narrow once women are equally represented in the industrial 
sample. We refrain from formulation expectations regarding the effect of balancing on children, 
as it is not clear ex ante what the effects could be.  
Field 
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Finally, we include a dummy variable that indicates whether a scientist is active in natural 
sciences. The baseline category represents engineering. Natural scientists are significantly more 
likely to work in academe than in industry (63% versus 51%, p<0.001). Assuming that they work 
on more basic research projects compared to engineers, the wage gap should again narrow once 
we take this into account. 
As most characteristics of scientists that are supposed to be positively (negatively) 
correlated with wages are overrepresented (underrepresented) in the sample of industrial 
researchers compared to their academic counterparts, we expect that the wage gap between 
academe and industry narrows significantly after balancing both samples.  
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
 Academia before matching (n=486) Potential controls in industry (n=759) p-value of two-sided 
t-test on mean differences 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
TASTE_SCIENCE 0.43 0.86 -1.63 1.02 1.27 -0.28 0.98 -1.94 -0.36 1.47 p<0.001 
RES_SHARE 50.34 35.67 0.00 50.00 100.00 29.18 28.98 0.00 20.00 100.00 p<0.001 
DEV_SHARE 7.43 15.63 0.00 0.00 100.00 40.16 32.33 0.00 40.00 100.00 p<0.001 
TASTE_BUSINESS -0.12 0.43 -0.55 -0.29 2.05 0.08 1.23 -0.55 -0.14 9.60 p<0.001 
CAREER_YEARS 11.85 8.38 0.00 10.50 29.75 11.45 7.53 0.00 10.00 29.92 p=0.381 
AGE 41.70 8.75 27.00 41.00 63.00 40.88 7.48 27.00 39.00 61.00 p=0.080 
TIME_CURRENTJOB 8.84 9.23 0.00 5.00 37.00 7.41 6.77 0.00 5.00 30.00 p=0.002 
RELATIONSHIP 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00 1.00 p=0.436 
CHILDREN 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 p<0.001 
GENDER 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 p=0.011 
TIMETOPHD_PROP 1.00 0.30 0.05 0.96 2.40 0.97 0.28 0.02 0.94 2.72 p=0.176 
SCHOLARSHIP 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 p=0.023 
HOURS_WORKED 50.10 8.38 38.00 50.00 72.00 48.11 7.03 38.00 48.00 72.00 p<0.001 
NATURAL SCIENCES 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 p<0.001 
WAGE 52203.12 17348.76 20000.00 49100.00 120000.00 67019.13 29556.26 19000.00 60000.00 200000.00 p<0.001 
Notes: Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. 
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5. Results 
5.1. The size of the wage gap 
Before tackling potential selection effects through matching, we estimate the wage gap 
using standard OLS regression, where the depended variable is the logarithm of the absolute 
yearly wage. Table 4 shows the corresponding results. Regressing the dependent variable only on 
a dummy ‘ACADEME‘, which indicates academic scientists by taking on value one (zero 
otherwise), reveals an average wage gap of 19.75% (column 1).
17
 The estimated wage gap 
increases slightly (but not significantly, χ2(1)=0.58, p=0.4469) to 20.90% once other observable 
factors are taken into account. As can be expected, wage follows an inverse-U shape through 
time, and increases in job tenure and hours worked. Wages also increase in taste for business.  
While this analysis provides some first insights regarding the size of the wage gap, the 
unequally distributed characteristics of academic and industrial scientists may confound the 
estimation. Further, it is implicitly assumed that the covariates have the same effects in academe 
and industry.
18
 To mitigate the first issue, we re-estimate the average wage gap using a matched 
sample. The second issue is dealt with by additional analyses of the determinants of the wage 
differential using matched academe-industry pairs as the unit of observation.  
Table A4 in the appendix presents the Probit model used for the propensity score matching. 
For 29 academic scientists no adequate match could be found due to lack of common support. 
Hence, we exclude them from the following investigation. As this reduction amounts to less than 
3 percent of the full sample and the sample mean wage and other controls stay almost the same 
(no statistically significant changes), the sample reduction does not affect the analysis. No 
                                                 
17
 Marginal effect calculated as exp(-0.2196)-1; analogue for the other marginal effects described in this section. 
18
 Columns five and six of Table 6 below show that this assumption does not hold for all covariates. 
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significant differences remain between the two groups after the matching, as shown by two-sided 
t-tests on differences in the means of each variable in Table 5. Further, Table A4, column 2, 
provides the results of a re-estimation of the aforementioned Probit model based on the matched 
sample of academic and industrial scientists. A χ2-test on the joint significance of all explanatory 
variables indicates that both samples show no significant differences in their covariates anymore 
(χ2(14)=6.10, p=0.9640). 
After matching the difference between the average annual wage in industry and the average 
annual wage in academe becomes €11.828 (two-sided t-test on mean differences of wages before 
and after matching: t(455)=-2.91, p=0.004), or a decrease of the wage gap by 20.2 percent 
(initially €14.816). In relative numbers, the descriptive wage gap decreased by 5.8 percentage 
points from 28.3 percent to 22.5 percent.
19
  
To estimate the wage gap after matching, we regress wage on the ACADEME dummy. 
Without the inclusion of other controls, the average wage difference between industry and 
academe is estimated at 12.92% (p<0.10, Table 4, column 3). Controlling for other observables, 
the wage gap is highly significant at 13.19% (column 4).
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The analysis suggests that descriptive comparisons of average wages and estimates of the 
wage gap using standard OLS regressions overestimate the actual wage gap. Specifically, the 
average wage gap narrowed significantly from a 28% difference in means, to about 21% when 
using standard OLS regression, and further down to 13% if OLS regressions are combined with a 
balanced sample of academic and industrial scientist after matching. Hence, descriptive mean 
comparisons overestimate the wage gap by about 15 percentage points. 
                                                 
19
 Note that all results are even more pronounced if one considers the median wages instead of the means. 
20
 While we find some significant effects of covariates on wage after matching, this does not mean that the matching 
was unsuccessful. Rather, they should be interpreted as common trends across industry and academe. 
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Table 4: OLS Regression results 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Before matching After matching 
Dependent variable ln(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒) 
 
Coef Se Coef Se Coef Se Coef Se 
ACADEME -0.2196*** (0.0207) -0.2345*** (0.0202) -0.1384* (0.0727) -0.1415*** (0.0436) 
TASTE_SCIENCE   -0.0087 (0.0088)   -0.0210 (0.0229) 
RES_SHARE   0.0002 (0.0003)   -0.0010* (0.0006) 
DEV_SHARE   -0.0001 (0.0003)   0.0015* (0.0009) 
TASTE_BUSINESS   0.0140* (0.0072)   0.0202 (0.0312) 
CAREER_YEARS   0.0440*** (0.0042)   0.0695*** (0.0141) 
CAREER_YEARS_2   -0.0007*** (0.0001)   -0.0017*** (0.0005) 
TIME_CURRENTJOB   0.0054*** (0.0017)   0.0082** (0.0036) 
RELATIONSHIP   0.0522** (0.0237)   0.1393*** (0.0524) 
CHILDREN   0.0250 (0.0189)   -0.0041 (0.0444) 
GENDER   -0.0299 (0.0199)   -0.0134 (0.0383) 
SCHOLARSHIP   0.0067 (0.0159)   -0.0203 (0.0407) 
TIMETOPHD_PROP   -0.0182 (0.0292)   -0.0882 (0.0693) 
HOURS_WORKED   0.0084*** (0.0012)   0.0027 (0.0034) 
NATURAL   -0.0249 (0.0156)   -0.0737* (0.0393) 
INTERCEPT 11.0298*** (0.0145) 10.1754*** (0.0738) 10.9542*** (0.0711) 10.3544*** (0.1706) 
Number of observations 1245  1245  912  912  
R
2 
0.076  0.537  0.028  0.488  
Root MSE 0.3727  0.2653  0.4098  0.2997  
F-statistic 112.4988  76.4002  3.6207  13.9787  
Notes: This table presents OLS regressions of wage before and after matching. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate 
significance levels of coefficients: *: p<0.10; **: p <0.05; ***: p <0.01. (3-4): Clustered standard errors take repeated observations caused by sampling 
with replacement into account. Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. 
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Table 5: Summary statistics after matching 
 Academia after matching (n=456) Selected controls in industry (n=456) 
p-value of 
two-sided 
t-test on 
mean 
differences# Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
TASTE_SCIENCE 0.40 0.87 -1.63 1.02 1.27 0.42 0.84 -1.34 1.02 1.47 p=0.830 
RES_SHARE 47.78 34.95 0.00 50.00 100.00 50.23 41.80 0.00 52.50 100.0 p=0.619 
DEV_SHARE 7.89 16.02 0.00 0.00 100.00 9.37 14.95 0.00 0.00 90.00 p=0.429 
TASTE_BUSINESS -0.11 0.44 -0.55 -0.29 2.05 -0.13 0.47 -0.55 -0.29 7.06 p=0.783 
CAREER_YEARS 12.04 8.32 0.00 10.75 29.75 12.24 8.56 0.00 10.63 29.67 p=0.877 
AGE 41.79 8.70 27.00 41.00 63.00 42.16 8.56 0.00 1.00 1.00 p=0.755 
TIME_CURRENTJOB 8.69 9.16 0.00 5.00 37.00 8.53 7.50 0.00 6.50 30.00 p=0.849 
RELATIONSHIP 0.83 0.37 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00 1.00 p=0.823 
CHILDREN 0.57 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 p=0.836 
GENDER 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00 p=0.199 
TIMETOPHD_PROP 0.99 0.30 0.05 0.96 2.40 1.00 0.29 0.43 0.95 2.72 p=0.912 
SCHOLARSHIP 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 p=0.393 
HOURS_WORKED 49.82 8.22 38.00 50.00 70.00 50.51 8.02 38.00 50.00 70.00 p=0.502 
NATURAL SCIENCES 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 p=0.860 
WAGE 52474.41 17382.71 20000.00 49800.00 120000.00 64302.80 33311.52 21339.00 54000.00 200000.00 p=0.004 
Notes: #: p-values calculated using Lechner’s (2001) approximation of standard errors to account for sampling with replacement. 29 observations are excluded from the analysis 
after matching because the sample is restricted to common support as described in section 3. Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. 
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We can draw some interesting conclusions from our empirical analysis. First, even though 
differences in research activities and preferences are believed to be the main drivers of the 
academe-industry wage differential, the wage gap remains significant when these structural 
differences are controlled for. This could have several reasons. There might be significant 
differences in the appropriation of the returns to research between industry and academia. Firms 
are generally more inclined to commercialize findings, while academic institutes are more 
inclined to publish them. The differing goals of research might lead a researcher in industry to 
generate more appropriable value than the same researcher in academia. While the empirical 
analysis controls for research activities, this remains a structural difference between academic 
and industrial research.  
Academic scientists and researchers in industry might also pursue different activities 
outside of research. Academics mostly teach or participate in the administration of the university 
when not focusing on research or development, whereas industrial researchers might engage in 
management activities, which generate significant value for the firm. While we implicitly control 
for the share of time the researcher spends on non-research activities (through the shares of time 
spent on research and development), this remains another structural difference.  
Last, the expectation that the wage gap closes after matching builds on the belief that 
industrial scientists are willing to forgo monetary rewards for a higher focus on research 
activities, while academic scientists’ wages are relatively unaffected by the time they spend on 
research. The relatively small decrease of the wage gap after matching might indicate that other 
wage determinants that differ systematically across academic and industrial researchers exert a 
positive influence on the wage differential, such as differences in the time spent on development 
orientated research activities. In order to disentangle the positive and negative factors underlying 
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the wage gap, the upcoming section presents regressions of the estimated wage differences on 
research activities and other covariates. 
Figure 2 illustrates the heterogeneity in the wage gap through a plot of the cumulative 
distribution of the relative difference between the observed wage in academe and the estimated 
counterfactual wage in industry. While the average descriptive wage gap after matching is 
22.5%, 40% of the sampled academics actually earn more than the estimated wage in industry.
21
 
On the other hand, almost 20% of the sample might earn at least twice as much if they would 
work in industry. 
Figure 2: Cumulative distribution of the wage gap 
 
                                                 
21
 It should be noted here that this evaluation of the wage gap assumes that the academic would work for the average 
firm, instead of matching to a firm which suits his needs. If this matching were to happen, the wage gap could 
become even smaller for scientists who spend much time on research, as they are more likely to sort into firms 
which offer high freedom and lower wages. Scientists who spend more time on development should be more likely 
to sort into companies which focus more strongly on development, leading to an even higher wage differential. 
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5.2. Explaining the wage gap 
The aim of following analysis is to examine how differences in the time spent on research 
and development influence the academe-industry wage gap, holding personal characteristics 
constant. Therefore, we run a standard OLS regression of the estimated wage gap per academic 
scientist (i.e. 
est. counterfactual wage in industry
observed wage in academe
) on the scientist’s time spent on research, time spent on 
development, taste for science, taste for business, years since graduation in linear and quadratic 
terms, time in the current job, demographic controls, controls for ability, average hours worked, 
and a field control.
22
 In order to reduce the skewness of the wage gap distribution we estimate a 
semi-elastic model, taking the natural logarithm of the relative wage differential as the dependent 
variable. Table 6 presents the results. 
                                                 
22
 To avoid multicollinearity we include CAREER_YEARS but not AGE in the regression. The results are robust to 
employing AGE instead of CAREER_YEARS. 
33 
 
Table 6: OLS Regression of the Individual Wage Gap 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable ln (
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑎
) ln(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒) in Academia 
ln(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒) 
of selected industry controls 
 
Coef Se Coef Se Coef Se Coef Se Coef Se 
TASTE_SCIENCE -0.0162 (0.0273) -0.0508 (0.0767) -0.5060 (0.3520) 0.0011 (0.0156) -0.0396 (0.0360) 
RES_SHARE -0.0032*** (0.0008) -0.0018 (0.0011) -0.0046*** (0.0011) 0.0006 (0.0004) -0.0023*** (0.0008) 
DEV_SHARE 0.0030** (0.0013) 0.0034* (0.0019) 0.0043** (0.0020) 0.0001 (0.0006) 0.0028* (0.0015) 
TASTE_BUSINESS 0.0052 (0.0487) -0.1715* (0.0988) -0.0302 (0.0981) 0.0369 (0.0299) 0.0016 (0.0529) 
CAREER_YEARS -0.0315** (0.0125) 0.0083 (0.0191) -0.0498*** (0.0159) 0.0309*** (0.0065) 0.0856*** (0.0163) 
CAREER_YEARS_2 0.0002 (0.0004) -0.0009 (0.0006) 0.0009 (0.0006) -0.0003 (0.0002) -0.0024*** (0.0006) 
TIME_CURRENTJOB -0.0042 (0.0039) -0.0010 (0.0057) -0.0098* (0.0059) 0.0003 (0.0019) 0.0218*** (0.0065) 
RELATIONSHIP -0.0694 (0.0761) -0.0722 (0.1196) -0.0521 (0.0930) -0.0026 (0.0415) 0.3474*** (0.0913) 
CHILDREN 0.0518 (0.0575) 0.0532 (0.0879) 0.0576 (0.0761) 0.0314 (0.0268) -0.0400 (0.0707) 
GENDER 0.0688 (0.0690) 0.2842*** (0.1031) -0.0713 (0.0885) -0.0761** (0.0323) 0.0227 (0.0768) 
SCHOLARSHIP 0.1034** (0.0515) 0.0551 (0.0740) 0.1234* (0.0718) -0.0287 (0.0245) -0.0452 (0.0560) 
TIMETOPHD_PROP -0.0679 (0.0754) -0.0962 (0.1224) -0.0747 (0.1018) -0.0040 (0.0376) -0.1353 (0.1041) 
HOURS_WORKED -0.0055* (0.0031) 0.0003 (0.0041) -0.0101** (0.0042) 0.0053*** (0.0015) -0.0002 (0.0047) 
NATURAL 0.0260 (0.0513) 0.0890 (0.0742) -0.0042 (0.0688) -0.0621*** (0.0235) -0.0758 (0.0634) 
INTERCEPT 0.9240*** (0.2195) 0.2172 (0.3044) 1.8725*** (0.4451) 10.2601*** (0.1159) 10.3016*** (0.2592) 
Number of observations 456 
 
174 
 
282 
 
456 
 
456 
 
R
2 
0.226 
 
0.254 
 
0.280 
 
0.473 
 
0.628 
 
Root MSE 0.5170 
 
0.4645 
 
0.5357 
 
0.2389 
 
0.2977 
 
F-statistic 10.6699 
 
4.8140 
 
8.5379 
 
29.6733 
 
11.4601 
 
Notes: This table presents OLS regressions of the wage gap as generated by the matching procedure. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate 
significance levels of coefficients: *: p<0.10; **: p <0.05; ***: p <0.01. (1) dependent variable: treatment effect (ln(wage in industry/wage in academe)), full sample. (2) treatment 
effect regression for scientists with taste for science lower than or equal to the mean. (3) treatment effect regression for scientists with taste for science larger than the mean. (4) 
dependent variable: ln(wage) of academic scientists. (5) dependent variable: ln(wage) of selected industrial researchers. Clustered standard errors take repeated observations caused 
by sampling with replacement into account. Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. 
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The evidence supports the hypothesis that the wage gap is smaller for scientists who spend 
more time on research: it declines by 0.32 percent for each additional percent of time spent on 
research (column 1). Consistent with previous findings (e.g. Stern, 2004) and the notion of a 
dominating preference effect (hypothesis 1), differences in research orientation between 
academic and industrial scientists explain a large part of the positive wage differential. 
Comparing only academic scientists with those industrial scientists that are able to spend similar 
amounts of time on research, leaving all other covariates unaccounted, the academe-industry 
wage gap would indeed be much smaller than descriptive statistics suggest. Academic scientists 
who are full-time engaged in research would earn only 1.6% more in industry. In line with our 
conceptualization of wage dynamics in industry and academe, this effect is driven by a negative 
relation between research and wage in industry, while academic wages are not sensitive to 
differences in research time (models 4 and 5, Table 5). 
Spending more time on development increases the wage gap. With each additional percent 
of time spent on development oriented research by academic scientists, a comparable industrial 
scientist’s wage increases by 0.3 percent. The magnitude of the effect is not trivial: an average 
academic scientist who spends 50 percent of his time on development oriented research is subject 
to an estimated wage differential of 73.5 percent.
23,24
 Wage regressions within both sectors 
(models 4 and 5, Table 5) further show that this effect stems largely from a positive relation 
between development oriented research and wages within industry, while the relation is 
insignificant within academe. In terms of preference versus productivity effects, the negative 
relation between research and wages can be interpreted as preference effects dominating 
productivity effects, in line with the findings of Stern (2004) and Sauermann and Roach (2014). 
                                                 
23
 23 academics in the sample, or 5%, spend at least 50% of their time on development. 
24
 As noted above, these predictions assume that scientists would work for the average firm, instead of sorting into 
firms according to their preferences.  
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That development relates positively to industrial wages could either indicate a higher 
productivity effect, i.e. there occurs more rent-sharing with scientists who focus on more 
profitable development, or a lower preference effect, scientists enjoy working on development 
less and demand higher wages to do so. While our data do not allow us to separate these 
alternatives, we do show that the relation between wage and science is not exclusively negative: 
research in its most applied form relates to higher wages in industry. 
Apart from differences in research activities, the wage gap is also strongly affected by time 
since graduation: the wage gap decreases by approximately 3.2 percent per year.
25
 This result is 
in line with earlier findings of Stevens (2004) and Agarwal and Ohyama (2013), who both report 
converging earnings paths of academic and industrial scientists in the US. The effect seems to be 
driven by diminishing wage increases throughout time in industry, compared to linear wage 
increments in academe (column 4 and 5, Table 5). 
To test the moderating role of taste for science on the relation between research orientation 
and the wage gap (hypothesis 3), we split the sample in a low-taste-for-science and high-taste-
for-science group based on the mean values (columns 2 and 3).
26
 In line with the conceptual 
reasoning, the impact of RES_SHARE on the wage differential is higher in the high-taste-for-
science group (column 3) than in the low-taste-for-science group (column 2), indicating that high 
taste for science researchers are willing to trade of wage for more research orientation at higher 
levels than low taste for science researchers (F-test on differences between the coefficients of 
RES_SHARE in model 2 and 3: F(1,426)=3.12, p=0.0780). The results imply that academic 
                                                 
25
 Since the turning point of the estimated relationship between career years and the relative wage gap lies far out of 
the observed range of career years (315 years), the influence is almost linear with only slightly decreasing marginal 
effects. Including only the linear term or taking a logarithmic specification does not alter the results.  
26
 Alternatively, one could include a corresponding interaction term in the regression. However, interaction term 
specifications imply the assumption that all other covariates exert the same effect within both sub-groups, which is 
in our case not true. 
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researchers with a relatively high taste for science who spend much time on research face much 
lower comparable wages in industry. All other covariates equal, the wage gap for scientists with 
a rather high taste for science becomes zero at 86 percent of time spent on research. Scientists 
with a high taste for science who want to spend most of their time on research might thus be 
financially best off in an academic position. The effect of time spent on development is also 
larger for scientists with a high taste for science compared to those with a low taste for science, 
but the difference is not statistically significant (0.0034 in the low group versus 0.0043 in the 
high group, F(1,426)=0.11, p=0.7460). 
One limitation of this analysis is that the measures for research and development activities 
are rather broad and the actual underlying activities might still be quite heterogeneous. Even 
though they are more detailed than other measures used in previous studies, even more detailed 
information is needed to further disentangle which kinds of research activities, such as the 
possibility to publish research findings, are mainly responsible for wage differences between 
both sectors. ‘Research’ and ‘Development’ might also carry different meanings in academe and 
industry. While the survey clearly stated what is meant by each activity, divergent interpretations 
between the sectors remain a concern. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper provides new evidence on the academe-industry wage gap. Once common 
selection effects in the scientific labor market and potential confounding personal characteristics 
have been accounted for, the estimated wage gap is about 15 percentage points smaller than 
descriptive statistics would suggest. The wage differential varies with individual scientists’ focus 
on research versus development activities: academic scientists who spend much time on research 
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face much lower counterfactual wages, whereas academic scientists who spend much time on 
development activities face much higher ones. How much scientists pay to be scientists thus 
hinges on their research orientation.  
Further, the trade-off between wage and research time is much stronger for scientists with 
an above-average taste for science. Combined with the negative relationship between wages and 
research time in industry and the positive relationship between wages and development time, it 
could be argued that in terms of ‘research’ activities preference effects dominate productivity 
effects, whereas in terms of ‘development’ activities productivity effects dominate preference 
effects. 
While self-selection and different personal characteristics of academic and industrial 
scientists explain a large part of the wage gap, some difference still remains. Probable reasons 
for the remaining wage gap are a better appropriation and monetization of research findings in 
industry, differences in non-research related activities among academics and researchers, e.g. 
teaching versus managing, and the noncompetitive nature of academic wages in Belgium. 
Our results have practical implications for academic institutions, policy makers, and 
individual scientists. For academic institutions it is worthwhile to note that offering scientists the 
freedom to pursue their own research projects compensates for much lower monetary rewards in 
academe. Urging scientists to focus on more applied research projects might cause selection of 
academics into industry, since scientists can expect to receive much higher returns to 
development oriented research in industrial positions. This selection might be unwanted from the 
perspective of the university if it causes better scientists to leave academe.
27
 On the other hand, 
allowing for more commercialization might also create a more enjoyable academic workplace for 
                                                 
27
 In that regard, Balsmeier and Pellens (2014) find that academic scientists that patent are more likely to leave 
academe, and also publish more than average. 
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scientists who would have otherwise preferred a career in industry. The net effect of increased 
commercialization of research findings on the quality of academic scientists remains unknown 
but might be addressed by future research.  
If the obligatory commercialization of academic scientists’ research findings turns out to 
be a source of academic brain drain, it might be favorable to alleviate it. If commercialization is 
preferred, academic institutes might also put more weight on successful research 
commercialization when it comes to promotion decisions. That way, engaging in applied 
research can have positive wage benefits in academe, which would narrow the wage gap. 
From a policy point of view the relatively low wage gap faced by research focused 
scientists and the rather large wage gap of development oriented scientists might ensure an 
efficient allocation of different types of scientists into both sectors. Politicians and managers of 
academic institutions should, however, be aware of the fact that the less time academic scientists 
are able to focus on research the more attractive it becomes for scientists to seek an industrial 
position.  
It is imperative to keep in mind that these results come from a setting in which academic 
wages are subject to strong regulation. This is likely to affect the estimates of the size of the 
wage gap but is less likely to affect our assessment of selection and wage-research relationships, 
as the latter are very much in line with relationships found in US-based data.
28
 We can only 
provide some reasonable speculation about how the wage gap in more competitive environments 
might relate to our calculations. Assuming that such a system leads to higher wage offers (or 
higher salary due to performance contingent pay) for highly performant academic researchers, 
the industry-academe wage gap could become smaller for highly able academic scientists who 
                                                 
28
 For instance, our findings regarding motive-based selection into industry or academe are similar to those of Roach 
and Sauermann (2010), Sauermann and Roach (2012) and Agarwal and Ohyama (2013). Sauermann and Roach 
(2014) uncovers a similar relationship between motives and reservation wages for publishing. 
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focus on research. They might even experience a wage premium compared to what they could 
have earned in industry conditional on similar activities. The wage gap might also become wider 
for lowly skilled academics who focus on research, since they might attract lower wage offers 
than the academics in our sample. Differences in the relation between commercialization and the 
wage gap critically depend on whether commercialization performance is part of the wage 
determination. If it is, the wage gap might widen less strongly or might even become narrower 
for highly skilled scientists. Further analyses are required to test these notions empirically. 
Our findings also have a bearing on individual researchers’ decisions whether to pursue a 
career in academe or industry. As getting into the academic labor market becomes harder, 
scientists could consider employment in research-like industrial jobs. While those jobs offer 
lower wages compared to development-focused industrial research jobs, the wage difference 
compared to academe turns out to be rather small. Hence, they might be considered as welcome 
outlets for scientists who are forced to leave academe but still want to pursue research. It is also 
interesting to know that the perceived higher wages in industry are conditional on a focus on 
development oriented research and other activities that are unrelated to research. Future 
investigations might be able to answer the question which role the individual wage gap plays for 
scientists’ career decision and how it influences the allocation of research talent into both 
sectors.  
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Appendix 1: Data 
Starting from the initial dataset of the Careers of Doctorate Holders (CDH) survey we 
discarded a number of observations for various reasons. Of the 7,160 responses, 5,601 were 
employed at the time of the survey. 1,973 of those employed were employed in sectors other than 
academe or the private sector (such as the public sector or private nonprofits). Of the 3,628 
remaining observations, 1,713 were active in fields other than natural sciences or engineering.  
The remaining 1,915 observations were further scrutinized for inconsistencies.
29
 53 
academic scientists were removed from the sample because they reported distinctly non-
academic job descriptions, including ‘webmaster’, ‘secretary’, ‘manager’, or ‘coordinator’. 
Respondents who reported being employed in multiple positions were removed from the sample. 
These are problematic because job characteristics are only reported for the main position, and 
because it is not obvious to assign scientists with academic and industrial positions to one of the 
two groups. 38 academic scientists and 28 industrial researchers were thus dropped from the 
sample. Note that the academic scientists were mainly removed because of industry involvement, 
while the industrial researchers were employed in multiple jobs in industry. Also note that 
respondents (especially academic scientists) might still hold multiple affiliations on paper if they 
did not report them. As such, this restriction serves to remove respondents who in practice hold 
multiple jobs. 
Those who did not report wage or reported zero wages (224 observations), wages below 
the Belgian annual minimum wage (20 observations) or above the 99
th
 percentile (€200.000, 16 
observations) were not included in the analysis. Wages below the minimum wage are either 
                                                 
29
 The groups described here can overlap, e.g. they were all retained in the determination of which scientists to 
remove from the sample and then removed all the same time. 
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misreported (caused, for instance, by reporting monthly income instead of annual income), or the 
result of part-time employment, which is removed in the next step. The last group is so rare and 
unique in the Belgian academic labor market that it would be meaningless to search for 
comparable scientists. They also have unwarrantedly strong influence on the average wages. 
These limitations are however not likely to exclude specific groups of scientists (for instance, 
lower-earning females) from the analysis. 
In order to further ensure a reasonable comparability of the scientists included in the 
analysis, the sample was further restricted to scientists and researchers in the first 30 years after 
graduation (removing 232 scientists) who were older than 18 and younger than 65 at the moment 
the survey was carried out (removing 9 scientists). We also removed scientists and researchers 
who reported working less than full-time (38 hours, 86 observations) or more than 75 hours a 
week (the 99
th
 percentile, 21 observations). After further removing missing values on the 
variables of interest, this resulted in a total sample of 1245 scientists, 486 of which were 
employed in academe and 759 in industry. 
Lastly, scientists and researchers who reported spending in total more than 100 percent of 
their time on research and development were re-scaled to reflect a maximum time allocation of 
100 percent. 
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Appendix 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis used in Tastes Calculation 
Since the items are all binary, we employ the Tetrachoric correlation matrix for this 
analysis (Uebersax, 2000).
30
 The analysis returns a two factor solution, explaining 87 percent of 
total variation. Several rotations were applied from which we select the Varimax solution for 
interpretability. The first factor correlates with motivation through salary, extralegal benefits, 
career prospects, job security, and weakly with work circumstances. We name this factor “Taste 
for Business”. The second factor correlates with motivation through intellectual challenge, 
independence, contribution to society, and, more strongly, with work circumstances. We name 
this factor “Taste for Science”. Both were normalized for interpretability. 
Table A1: Tetrachoric correlation matrix 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
INTELLECTUAL CHALLENGE 1.00 
       SALARY 0.24 1.00 
      EXTRALEGAL BENEFITS 0.19 0.73 1.00 
     CAREER  0.42 0.47 0.36 1.00 
    JOB SECURITY 0.25 0.58 0.70 0.45 1.00 
   WORK CIRCUMSTANCES 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.23 0.33 1.00 
  INDEPENDENCE 0.79 0.13 -0.04 0.18 0.28 0.51 1.00 
 CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIETY 0.59 0.18 0.34 0.13 0.36 0.21 0.45 1.00 
 
Table A2: Results of EFA 
 
Factor loadings Uniqueness 
Item Taste for business Taste for science 
 
INTELLECTUAL CHALLENGE 0.17 0.89 0.18 
SALARY 0.78 0.12 0.38 
EXTRALEGAL BENEFITS 0.92 0.02 0.16 
CAREER  0.51 0.24 0.68 
JOB SECURITY 0.77 0.22 0.35 
WORK CIRCUMSTANCES 0.40 0.47 0.62 
INDEPENDENCE 0.00 0.92 0.15 
CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIETY 0.25 0.54 0.65 
Eigenvalue 2.55 2.28 
 
% of variance 46% 41% 
 
Note: Varimax rotation. Factor loadings over .40 appear in bold. 
                                                 
30
 Similar methods have been employed by Sauermann & Roach (2012). 
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Table A3: Correlation matrix 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 TASTE_SCIENCE 1.00 
              
 
2 RES_SHARE 0.24* 1.00 
             
 
3 DEV_SHARE -0.15* -0.23* 1.00 
            
 
4 TASTE_BUSINESS 0.03 0.01 0.02 1.00 
           
 
5 CAREER_YEARS 0.01 -0.12* -0.12* 0.07* 1.00 
          
 
6 AGE 0.00 -0.13* -0.11* 0.05 0.95* 1.00 
         
 
7 TIME_CURRENTJOB -0.03 -0.07* -0.07* 0.06* 0.73* 0.73* 1.00 
        
 
8 RELATIONSHIP 0.00 0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.08* 0.07* 0.05 1.00 
       
 
9 CHILDREN 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06* 0.38* 1.00 
      
 
10 GENDER -0.03 0.07* -0.13* -0.05 0.13* -0.14* -0.08* -0.11* -0.15* 1.00 
     
 
11 TIMETOPHD_PROP -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.09* 0.06* 0.01 0.00 0.03 1.00 
    
 
12 SCHOLARSHIP 0.03 0.07* 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.06* -0.05 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.16* 1.00 
   
 
13 HOURS_WORKED 0.04 0.01 -0.06* 0.02 0.2* 0.21* 0.16 0.10* 0.12* -0.20* -0.01 -0.02 1.00 
  
 
14 NATURAL SCIENCES 0.00 0.07* -0.10* 0.04 0.11* 0.06* 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.07* -0.02 0.07* -0.09* 1.00 
 
 
15 WAGE -0.11 -0.14* 0.07* 0.11* 0.59* 0.56* 0.46* 0.13* 0.07* -0.16* -0.04 0.02 0.27* -0.01 1.00 
 
16 HIGHER 0.33* 0.28* -0.50* -0.09* 0.04 0.05 0.08* -0.02 -0.07* 0.07* 0.03 -0.04 0.11* 0.10* -0.27* 1.00 
Notes: *: significant at p<0.05. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. 
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Table A4: Propensity score regressions 
 
(1) (2) 
Dependent variable: Treatment group Before matching After matching 
TASTE_SCIENCE 0.4295*** (0.0478) 0.0031 (0.0753) 
RES_SHARE 0.0071*** (0.0013) -0.0012 (0.0022) 
DEV_SHARE -0.0314*** (0.0021) -0.0033 (0.0035) 
TASTE_BUSINESS -0.2121*** (0.0763) 0.0562 (0.1202) 
CAREER_YEARS -0.0754*** (0.0204) -0.0009 (0.0310) 
AGE 0.0495** (0.0197) -0.0078 (0.0277) 
TIME_CURRENTJOB 0.0294*** (0.0085) 0.0088 (0.0123) 
RELATIONSHIP -0.0579 (0.1325) 0.1077 (0.2062) 
CHILDREN -0.2045** (0.0982) -0.0204 (0.1594) 
GENDER 0.0657 (0.1159) 0.2338 (0.1720) 
SCHOLARSHIP -0.1285 (0.0945) 0.1338 (0.1508) 
TIMETOPHD_PROP 0.0110 (0.1676) 0.0426 (0.2512) 
HOURS_WORKED 0.0227*** (0.0060) -0.0040 (0.0107) 
NATURAL 0.2867*** (0.0930) -0.0406 (0.1491) 
INTERCEPT -2.4178*** (0.6555) 0.3478 (1.0027) 
N 1245 914 
Pseudo-R
2 
0.38 0.01 
Test of joint significance χ2(14)= 630.52*** χ2(14)=6.10 
Notes: This table reports Probit model estimations of being in the treatment group. Standard errors in parentheses. After 
matching: clustered standard errors to account for repeated observations. * p<0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Variable definitions 
are provided in Table 1. 
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Appendix 4: Hourly wage results 
Table A5: OLS Regression results, hourly wages 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Before matching After matching 
Dependent variable ln(ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒) 
 
Coef Se Coef Se Coef Se Coef Se 
ACADEME -0.2569*** (0.0198) -0.2324*** (0.0201) -0.1242 (0.0830) -0.1417*** (0.0430) 
TASTE_SCIENCE   -0.0092 (0.0088)   -0.0216 (0.0228) 
RES_SHARE   0.0002 (0.0003)   -0.0010* (0.0006) 
DEV_SHARE   -0.0001 (0.0003)   0.0015* (0.0009) 
TASTE_BUSINESS   0.0140* (0.0071)   0.0213 (0.0305) 
CAREER_YEARS   0.0438*** (0.0042)   0.0691*** (0.0140) 
CAREER_YEARS_2   -0.0007*** (0.0001)   -0.0017*** (0.0005) 
TIME_CURRENTJOB   0.0054*** (0.0016)   0.0081** (0.0035) 
RELATIONSHIP   0.0498** (0.0236)   0.1354*** (0.0522) 
CHILDREN   0.0249 (0.0188)   -0.0006 (0.0440) 
GENDER   -0.0292 (0.0198)   -0.0106 (0.0377) 
SCHOLARSHIP   0.0062 (0.0158)   -0.0174 (0.0402) 
TIMETOPHD_PROP   -0.0172 (0.0289)   -0.0812 (0.0683) 
HOURS_WORKED   -0.0114*** (0.0012)   -0.0169*** (0.0034) 
NATURAL   -0.0228 (0.0155)   -0.0690* (0.0392) 
INTERCEPT 3.2953*** (0.0136) 3.3929*** (0.0729) 3.1737*** (0.0817) 3.5600*** (0.1684) 
Number of observations 1245  1245  912  912  
R
2 
0.112  0.510  0.022  0.496  
Root MSE 0.3534  0.2640  0.4106  0.2971  
F-statistic 168.3626  74.0830  2.2386  14.6211  
Notes: This table presents OLS regressions of log(wage) before and after matching. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate 
significance levels of coefficients: *: p<0.10; **: p <0.05; ***: p <0.01. (3-4): Clustered standard errors take repeated observations caused by sampling with 
replacement into account. Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. 
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Table A6: OLS Regression of individual wage gap, hourly wages 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable ln (
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑎
) ln(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒) in academia 
ln(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒) 
of selected industry controls 
 
Coef Se Coef Se Coef Se Coef Se Coef Se 
TASTE_SCIENCE -0.0455* (0.0269) -0.0580 (0.0743) -0.5824* (0.3501) -0.0003 (0.0156) -0.0409 (0.0356) 
RES_SHARE -0.0040*** (0.0008) -0.0022* (0.0012) -0.0059*** (0.0011) 0.0006 (0.0004) -0.0023*** (0.0008) 
DEV_SHARE 0.0040*** (0.0013) 0.0035* (0.0018) 0.0060*** (0.0019) 0.0001 (0.0006) 0.0027* (0.0015) 
TASTE_BUSINESS 0.0334 (0.0499) -0.1576* (0.0894) 0.0024 (0.0990) 0.0381 (0.0297) 0.0011 (0.0521) 
CAREER_YEARS -0.0303** (0.0125) 0.0069 (0.0185) -0.0491*** (0.0159) 0.0304*** (0.0066) 0.0856*** (0.0161) 
CAREER_YEARS_2 0.0003 (0.0004) -0.0009* (0.0006) 0.0010* (0.0006) -0.0002 (0.0002) -0.0023*** (0.0006) 
TIME_CURRENTJOB -0.0067* (0.0039) -0.0003 (0.0052) -0.0149** (0.0061) 0.0002 (0.0019) 0.0214*** (0.0064) 
RELATIONSHIP -0.0452 (0.0769) -0.0681 (0.1176) -0.0087 (0.0924) -0.0026 (0.0417) 0.3402*** (0.0910) 
CHILDREN 0.0554 (0.0580) 0.0536 (0.0818) 0.0775 (0.0775) 0.0322 (0.0267) -0.0378 (0.0701) 
GENDER 0.0604 (0.0699) 0.2620** (0.1007) -0.0715 (0.0903) -0.0740** (0.0322) 0.0184 (0.0757) 
SCHOLARSHIP 0.1396*** (0.0509) 0.0619 (0.0705) 0.1783** (0.0706) -0.0289 (0.0245) -0.0431 (0.0555) 
TIMETOPHD_PROP -0.1008 (0.0764) -0.1618 (0.1137) -0.0986 (0.1053) -0.0021 (0.0373) -0.1198 (0.1025) 
HOURS_WORKED 0.0129*** (0.0031) 0.0198*** (0.0040) 0.0069* (0.0041) -0.0142*** (0.0015) -0.0195*** (0.0047) 
NATURAL -0.0025 (0.0514) 0.0761 (0.0708) -0.0457 (0.0691) -0.0605** (0.0234) -0.0697 (0.0630) 
INTERCEPT 0.0505 (0.2205) -0.6337** (0.2934) 1.0918** (0.4536) 3.4662*** (0.1157) 3.4830*** (0.2571) 
Number of observations 456  174  282  456  456  
R2 0.238  0.304  0.288  0.434  0.647  
Root MSE 0.5158  0.4446  0.5380  0.2388  0.2947  
F-statistic 10.6697  5.8267  8.0369  26.9804  10.0561  
Notes: This table presents OLS regression results. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance levels of coefficients: *: p<0.10; **: p <0.05; 
***: p <0.01. wage = wage per hour. (1) dependent variable: treatment effect (ln(wage in industry/wage in academia)), full sample. (2) treatment effect regression for scientists 
with taste for science lower than or equal to mean. (3) treatment effect regression for scientists with taste for science higher than mean. (4) dependent variable: ln(wage) of 
academic scientists. (5) dependent variable: ln(wage) of selected industrial researchers. Clustered standard errors to take repeated observations caused by sampling with 
replacement into account. Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1.  
